The theory of construction of scientific knowledge has been examined traditionally through positivist lenses. The empirical background of scientific knowledge is based in quantitative analyses and evidentiary based studies that rely on human observations to prove or disprove theories or statement of facts. Developed by Auguste Comete, the logical positivist influence molded much of scientific knowledge right until the early twentieth century and was bereft of normative aspects of associated disciplines of science. The natural sciences wielded much influence over the methodological supremacy of knowledge construction. Positivism focused on the measurable aspects of science and relied on the cumulative or progressive nature of building theories as a measure of constructing scientific knowledge. The core belief was constituted by the verifiability of facts by empirical observation of reality.
Initiated by Hume and furthered by Karl Popper, the standards for scientific knowledge veered from verifiability to falsifiability. This departure from having to prove facts to having to withstand disproving facts was initiated by the problem of induction. Scientific knowledge until then was based on inductive methods that relied on observations. The inherent logic of induction was cyclical and observation of a single anomaly rendered the entire approach invalid. Thus, logically speaking, no amount of positive outcomes or verifiable observations can confirm a scientific theory especially when a single counter observation can disprove the theory thus constructed.
According to Popper, scientific knowledge is inherently conjectural and hypothetical that can only be subjected to rigorous scientific tests [in reference to their implications] but can never be accepted as disprovable fact. Thus, Popper used the test of falsifiability as a measure for setting scientific standards. He used this test as a ‘criteria of demarcation’ between scientific knowledge and metaphysical hypothesis. According to Popper, any theory or statement that aspires to be scientific shall also incorporate disproving statements along with proof statement within its construction i.e. their formulation shall be such that “to verify them and to falsify them must both be logically possible.”
The method of observation was also discounted as being fallible to our sensory limitations and prejudiced perceptions of the subject matter. Objective examination of scientific knowledge termed as critical rationalism called for the distinguishing system to be different from the one that represents our world of experience. Subjective experiences and “feelings of conviction” should be clearly differentiated from the logical relations of the scientific statements. Thus, the focus was shifted from inductive reasoning to deductive analysis. The deductive method of testing is not intended to establish or justify the statements that are being tested thus it does not suffer from the infinite regress problem that plagues induction. The standard for scientific knowledge, according to Popper, was not in the actual implementation of testing of any scientific fact but rather in the capability of being tested thus.
On a related note, although Popper’s departure from empiricism to falsification and critical rationalism was noteworthy, subsequent contributions by Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn greatly clarified the methods by which standards for scientific knowledge are set. Using the criticism of Duhem-Quine thesis that it doesn’t help to discard the set of theories when in fact only one element of the theoretical package has been falsified, Lakatos clarified Popper’s ‘naïve falsification’.
The Lakatosian standard for scientific knowledge emphasized that research programs rather than universal statements are falsified. The body of statements that envelope a core truth-statement are subjected to tests of falsification before the core is tested. Only when the supporting research programs fail to live up to the tests, is the core universal statement challenged and subsequently changed if falsified. Thomas Kuhn relied on the use of paradigms to explain the progress of scientific standards rather than a falsificationist methodology that he said was not typical of the scientific community.
This was a brief summary of the epistemological approaches of scientific knowledge and establishment of standards that constituted science. I shall now explore the suitability of such standards for planning and policy inquiry.